The Future of History of Psychology is History

By: Hans van Rappard

In 1981 I went to a conference of the Cheiron society for the first time. There, in River Falls, Wisconsin, I ran into Kurt Danziger and Joseph Brozek, who both, though independently, persuaded me that this was the time to found a Cheiron society in Europe. Bill Woodward, who was to spend his umpteenth European sabbatical in Heidelberg would provide me with the addresses of prospective attendees and general encouragement, but, he said, he was glad that the necessary letters would be coming from my desk. So, early 1982 a number of letters did come from my desk and in September a conference took place in Amsterdam. There were less than 40 delegates and the only reason why a tolerable programme could be drafted was that Helio Carpintero took care of at least three papers. But we did have fun, and it was decided by the fifteen odd participants who bothered to attend the business meeting that what was then called Cheiron Europe should be founded, and that the next conferences would take place in Heidelberg, and then Rome and Paris.

Right from the beginning, the name Cheiron Europe presented difficulties, and kept on doing so until the 15th conference in Leiden when the name was changed into ESHHS. Interestingly, the historians who lived and worked under the Paris-Berlin axis, the garlic-and-kraut Cheironners so to speak, tended to be highly suspicious about the name of Cheiron, which, in spite of the addition of ‘Europe’ seemed to suggest close ties with the American organisation. On the other hand, the Dutch, the British, the Spanish, and the odd Scandinavian were not worried by the name at all, while the French quickly decided to lock themselves up in an organisation of their own. And the Americans? The Americans did not give a shit. It may be interesting therefore, to see what will come out of next year’s joint Cheiron – ESHHS conference.

The early conferences were fun: very informal with rarely more than sixty participants, and sometimes papers in four languages. What added to the fun was that few Cheironners bothered to pay dues. During the last conference that I have attended, the 2004 gathering in Salzburg, ESHHS seemed not to have changed much, except that the papers were exclusively in English. And hopefully, nowadays the ESHHS’ers pay their dues.

If my memory serves me, it was Alan Collins, who, at one point during the Salzburg conference wondered “Why don’t psychologists read our work?” I don’t remember if it was part of his talk or exclaimed during the discussion but he raised a significant point. However, I doubt if the question was phrased correctly. Instead of “Why don’t psychologists read our work?” I feel that it had better been put as “Why should psychologists read our work?” Indeed, why on earth should they?

As I see it, history of psychology is a two-faced affair; it may look into two different directions. A few examples: According to philosopher-historian Richard Watson (2002), the history of philosophy is of course history, but at the same time it is a contribution to philosophy. Biologist-historian Ernst Mayr (1990) observed that professional historians of biology will ask questions that are likely to be quite different than those asked by biologists interested in the history of their field. And psychologist-historian Franz Samelson (1999, p. 253) considers his work in history as “doing social psychology by non-experimental means”. Or take economics – until the end of the last century, in many departments a division of labour could be seen in the history of the field between economist-historians studying ‘the history of economic thought’, and professional historians who occupied themselves with ‘economic and social history’. In these examples one sees scientist-historians (also known as amateurs or old historians), geared to what sociologist Henrika Kuklick (1999) called ‘active participation’ in their disciplines on the one hand, and professional historians (also known as critical or new historians), pursuing full-blown history on the other hand. My polemics with psychologist-historian Kurt Danziger (Van Rappard, 1997) focused on the question as to how one might ‘actively participate’ in current issues in psychology by assuming the role of a professional historian. In other words, how could one contribute to psychology by researching the kind of questions asked in a different field?

As you may have grasped from the way I phrased these questions, my answer to the problem of Alan Collins is that if you want psychologists to read your work, you have got to speak their language. However, and this takes me to the next part of this talk, the more you incline to history, the less you will be able to do so.

What is the present situation of the field? As I see it, history of psychology currently finds itself in a tight spot. This is so because, while the majority of the workers in the field, the psychologist-historians, are affiliated to psychology departments it is, generally speaking, the professional, new history that qua status and prestige has for twenty or thirty years now been carrying the day. “The aims of the new history of psychology have been accepted virtually without protest by many in the field. It is difficult to find a journal article, research monograph, or even an undergraduate textbook that defends the old history in any way. Even when authors do not practice the tenets of the old history, they are anxious to preach them” (Lovett, 2006, p. 24). Now, if this is how the matter stands in the field, one need not be surprised to see that the position of the psychologist-historian is steadily eroded.

A couple of years ago, Fuchs and Viney (2002, p. 12) wrote on ‘The Course in the History of Psychology’. One of their conclusions was, “That the course is offered by most departments and that many psychologists are committed to it is a positive sign for the future of the course. However, that optimistic interpretation is balanced by the small but nevertheless disturbing indication that some psychologists do not value the course sufficiently to commit staffing resources to it, that some departments will drop the course should the present instructor cease to offer it, and that a number of departments do not require the course for psychology majors”. The latter part of this quote describes quite accurately what has happened in Holland, where Trudy Dehue in Groningen is the only one who has managed to stay around (and pretty well at that) but the other units have been discontinued in recent years. Is Holland unique in this respect? I think not. I rather think that Kurt Danziger (1997) was right when he wrote that the “future of psychology’s history is not its past” – but I wonder if he realised what that might involve. What it has come to involve, it seems to me, is that at least at the research universities (in teaching colleges the situation may be different), psychologist-historians are in danger of disappearing from their departments. However, if Holland is not unique in this, history of psychology is not unique either.

I would like to quote from a review of a book on the future of the history of economics (Leonard, 2004, p. 483). The review begins with the observation that the ‘history of economic thought’, “…is on its last legs. Now no more necessary to the pursuit of economic research than is the history of chemistry to that field, it is disappearing from the syllabi of doctoral programs … Part of the problem is related to a phenomenon emphasized by Adam Smith himself: increasing specialization and division of labor. Economics now boasts many subfields … In addition to pure theory and applied fields, all aspiring economists must invest in training in mathematics, statistics, and econometrics. All of this increasingly specialized effort, coupled with the disappearance of liberal, humanistic ideals in university education, has seen the modern economist grow increasing[ly] oblivious to his or her intellectual roots.” Is not this an accurate description of what is happening in psychology?

I would like to have it clear that I don’t deplore the professionalisation of the history of psychology, including the linguistic, cultural, and, generally speaking, post-modern turns that accompanied and supported it. But what I do deplore is that all these turns have also been turns away from psychology. What I mean has clearly been stated by Henk Stam (2004, p. 29). Speaking about critical historians Stam wrote that they have “shifted their allegiance and they are no longer beholden to the scientific claims of the discipline … Their regulative community exists elsewhere … Hence their histories contribute theory to different sensibilities and criteria for knowledge”. (Cf. Ernst Mayr, above). I have no qualms with this development. Surely, professional history is a beautiful field. Moreover, ‘doing history’ might free one from the need to kowtow for recognition from the discipline. But the downside is that psychologists stand to loose. As Lovett (2006, p. 34) concluded, “The key to mutual respect between the new history and psychology may be clarity regarding the goals of each. When new historians “put questions of truth on one side” (Danziger, 1990, p. 12), they cannot simultaneously use information from history to pass judgment on the theories and practices of psychology today … Those historians who wish to influence psychologists, then, should recognize that if we explicitly warn historians against making their writings positive toward psychology, we are likely to lose the audience that most requires the accuracy and insights of the history of psychology: the critically thinking psychologist”.

I would like to return to Lovett’s first line on the need for clarity on the goals of the many different historiographies that are on offer today. When I was active in the field, my goal was different than that of the professional historian, critical, new, or otherwise. It was different because I felt, along with Henrika Kuklick (1999, p. 227) in sociology, that “because many of the problems addressed by social scientists in the past still seemed vital, contemporary practitioners could learn from their history”. Apparently many economists also felt that the great dead economic thinkers (Rorty) were “still-active participants in their debates” (Kuklick, 1999, p. 232), and the same goes for many early and contemporary historians of psychology. But, as pointed out, this position may be increasingly difficult to hold. For instance, the history of economics is advised to “cut its umbilical cord to the discipline of economics proper, just as the various parts of the history of science have done with respect to their scientific fields” (Leonard, 2004, p. 483).

As for me, my sympathies clearly rest with the ‘old, uncritical history of psychology’, modelled on the role that history, although not unchallenged, is still allowed to play in philosophy. But I cannot but agree with Kurt Danziger (1997) that, indeed, the future of the field cannot be its past. After all, the old history of psychology is itself becoming history. Therefore, if I had another, say, twenty years in academe ahead of me, I would try to secure a niche for myself in the methodology unit. With luck, this might enable me to do historical-theoretical work in the field (call it ‘history of psychological thought’ if you please) which might be deemed worth reading by the odd psychologist.

References
Danziger, K. (1994). Does the history of psychology have a future? Theory & Psychology, 4, 467-484

Danziger, K. (1997). The future of psychology’s history is not its past: A reply to Rappard. Theory & Psychology, 7, 107-111

Fuchs, A.H. & Viney, W. (2002). The course in the history of psychology: Present status and future concerns. History of Psychology, 5, 3-15

Kuklick, H. (1999). Assessing research in the history of sociology and anthropology. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 35, 227-237

Leonard, R. (2004). Review of R. Weintraub (ed.), The future of the history of economics, Duke U.P., 2002. ISIS, 95, 482-483

Lovett, B.J. (2006). The new history of psychology: A review and critique. History of Psychology, 9, 17-37

Mayr, E. (1990). When is historiography whiggish? Journal of the History of Ideas, 51, 301-309

Rappard, J.F.H. van (1997). History of psychology turned inside(r) out: A comment on Danziger. Theory & Psychology, 7, 101-105

Samelson, F. (1999). Assessing research in the history of psychology: Past, present, and Future. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 35, 247-255.

Stam, H.J. (2004). Reconstructing the subject: Kurt Danziger and the revisionist project in historiographies of psychology. In A.C. Brock, J. Louw & W. van Hoorn (eds.). Rediscovering the history of psychology: Essays inspired by the work of Kurt Danziger (19-32). New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers

Watson, R.A. (2002). What is the history of philosophy and why is it important? Journal of the History of Philosophy, 40, 525-528.